In order to realize the wide-scale deployment of high-endurance, unattended mobile sensing technologies, it is vital to ensure the self-preservation of the sensing assets. Deployed mobile sensor nodes face a variety of physical security threats including theft, vandalism and physical damage. Unattended mobile sensor nodes must be able to respond to these threats with control policies that facilitate escape and evasion to a low-risk state. In this work the Precision Immobilization Technique (PIT) problem has been considered. The PIT maneuver is a technique that a pursuing, car-like vehicle can use to force a fleeing vehicle to abruptly turn ninety degrees to the direction of travel. The abrupt change in direction generally causes the fleeing driver to lose control and stop. The PIT maneuver was originally developed by law enforcement to end vehicular pursuits in a manner that minimizes damage to the persons and property involved. It is easy to imagine that unattended autonomous convoys could be targets of this type of action by adversarial agents. This effort focused on developing control policies unattended mobile sensor nodes could employ to escape, evade and recover from PIT-maneuver-like attacks. The development of these control policies involved both simulation as well as small-scale experimental testing. The goal of this work is to be a step toward ensuring the physical security of unattended sensor node assets.
Great white shark bite on Spray underwater glider 1, 2 . Attack took place off the coast of California.
The Spray underwater glider 1,2 is a mobile sensor node that propels itself through the ocean by using battery powered pumps to change its buoyancy. Spray is equipped with a pair of hydrofoils that produce lift when the buoyancy change causes the glider to rise or fall through the water column. Spray is capable of long-term (few weeks to several months) ocean measurements in an unattended mode. Prior to mobile nodes such as Spray, oceanographic measurements were typically made from instruments lowered by ships or suspended by moorings. The ship cruises would last up to about 2 months, while the moorings may last two years. The high cost of these sensing platforms restricted their use and limited the amount of data available for interior ocean studies. In contrast, the cost of Spray is roughly equivalent to a few days of ship time, it is reusable, it is lightweight, and can operate unattended for more than a year while traversing thousands of kilometers. Furthermore, on-board satellite communications allow Spray to report its measurements to the shore when it is on the surface, as well as receive shore commands for course changes. The advent of low-cost mobile sensor nodes such as Spray has allowed a substantial increase in the spatial and temporal density of interior ocean measurements 2 .
A refined version of Spray has operated in the sea for more than 2,000 days total since 2003. During this time Spray has experienced two types of events that are relevant to a discussion on physical security. First, on four different occasions sea glider missions have been shortened by premature intentional recovery by fishermen. Three of these events took place within 16 km of the shore. In two cases the fishermen thought the gliders were not functioning and happily returned them. One situation required negotiations with the fisherman for the return of the glider, and another required calling law enforcement. There have actually been two separate occasions when Spray gliders ceased functioning and helpful fishermen recovered and returned the gliders seeking nothing in compensation. Based on these experiences, it is clear that unattended mobile sensor nodes will require strategies to cope with potentially unfriendly human agents that may try to compromise their physical security. The other type of physical security breach experienced by Spray was caused by fish attacks. Figure 1 shows the nose cone of a spray glider that was attacked by a great white shark off the coast of California. Scratches on Spray's nose from the bite are clearly visible. The fish attacks are most obvious when the in-flight data shows the glider being upset or being carried up and down in the water. There are currently 10 examples of fish attacks to the Spray gliders and they are considered fairly common. The gliders have been attacked by sharks and billfish. The fish attacks are a relatively small problem for the current Spray gliders, but these types of physical attacks need to be considered when designing future mobile sensor nodes for interior ocean observation. Spray's long and varied history of unattended mobile sensing clearly shows the need to consider physical security challenges that may arise when designing mobile sensor nodes and networks. Spray was operating in a somewhat remote environment and only had occasional encounters with passing fishermen. In the case of ground-based mobile sensor nodes that can easily be accessed by humans, physical security will undoubtedly be a larger concern.
BACKGROUND
Mobile sensor nodes are inherently cyber-physical systems in the sense that they possess tight interplay between their mechanical, electrical, computational, and information systems. As such, the security issues surrounding mobile sensor nodes will typically display a tight coupling between physical security and cyber security concerns. A mobile sensor node could be compromised in a variety of ways that would impact both cyber and physical security. For example, if an unattended mobile sensor node is physically stolen, its hard drive could be removed and the sensitive data on-board could be stolen or altered. Alternatively, the wireless network used to control and receive data from a mobile sensor node could be compromised. As a result, malicious software could be downloaded to a mobile sensor node that causes it to perform undesired actions, cause the sensor node to shut down, or report corrupted data to its owners. The tight coupling of electrical, mechanical and information systems onboard mobile sensors nodes will require security approaches to mobile sensor nodes that comprehensively address physical and cyber security concerns. Fortunately, work from a variety of domains can be leveraged to help achieve comprehensive cyber-physical security of mobile sensor nodes.
Modern automobiles are complex cyber-physical systems that present unique security challenges 3 . It has been shown that the embedded control systems connected to the CAN bus in a modern automobile could be cracked relatively easily using off-the-shelf components 3 . These researchers were able to control many automotive systems including the radio, instrument panel cluster, door locks, windshield wipers, engine control module, brakes and HVAC system. It was shown that data sent to the automobile user could be corrupted by malicious software. It was also found, that evidence of a security beach could to a large degree be hidden, thus complicating efforts at forensic investigation. It was quite surprising to find that the coupling between mechanical and computational resources on an automobile would facilitate the ability for a hostile agent to compromise safety-critical systems such as the brakes and the engine control unit. The lessons learned from this paper should be considered when ensuring the secure design of cyber-physical systems.
The work described here focuses on the physical security of mobile sensor nodes. Specifically, helping mobile sensor nodes avoid capture, theft and tampering by unfriendly agents. These types of breaches in physical security could easily lead to coupled cyber-physical security threats 4 . One large body of work addressing these types of issues is differential game theory also referred to as the study of pursuit-evasion games. This body of work is quite large. For these preliminary studies, much information was taken from the navigation and guidance community 5, 6 . Specifically techniques such as proportional navigation were explored as a potential method to capture a nonholonomic ground-based mobile sensor node. This preliminary work primarily focused on the development of nonholonomic versions of velocitypursuit. These control policies were used to help enable a mobile sensor node to capture as well as resist capture by PIT maneuver. It is important to note that differential game research typically uses a capture criterion that says capture has been achieved if the pursuer is within some distance from the evader, or the evader has become observable by the pursuer's sensors. In this work capture is achieved if the pursuer can execute a PIT maneuver on the fleeing mobile sensor node.
PIT MANEUVER
Ensuring the cyber-physical security of a mobile sensor node requires that a wide array of possible situations all be addressed. This work focuses on the physical security problem of a high-speed, car-like, ground-based mobile sensor node that is being pursued by another similarly-sized, car-like node. This problem is considered noteworthy given the given the current interest in developing autonomous automobiles 7 . It is easy to imagine that an autonomous automobile would be a tempting target for thieves. A thief targeting an autonomous automobile may be interested in keeping the automobile intact in order to maintain its integrity and resale value. Alternatively the automobile may be carrying a delicate, high-value cargo, and thieves may wish to stop the automobile while minimizing the probability of damaging the item they are interested in stealing. Clearly the theft problem must be dealt with in order for the use of autonomous automobiles to become widespread.
It is very likely that a thief wishing to intercept an operational autonomous automobile while inflicting the minimum amount of damage on the automobile may attempt to employ the precision immobilization technique or PIT maneuver to capture the vehicle. The PIT maneuver was originally developed by law enforcement as a tool to end high-risk vehicular chases in a pseudo-safe manner. When applied correctly, the PIT maneuver can be used by a pursuing vehicle to cause a fleeing vehicle to turn 90 deg from its direction of travel, lose control, and stop. The PIT maneuver is executed as follows 8 . First, the pursuer pulls alongside the fleeing vehicle so that the portion of the pursuing vehicle in front of the front axle is behind the portion of the fleeing vehicle behind its rear axle. The lateral clearance between the two vehicles is brought within an appropriate range 8 , and then the pursuing vehicle steers sharply into the fleeing vehicle. The force imparted to the fleeing vehicle induces it to spin. Generally the fleeing vehicle will turn about its yaw axis so it crosses in front of the pursuing vehicle and then spins off to its side. If executed properly, the pursuing vehicle should maintain control and continue in a forward direction. A thorough study on the dynamic effect of the various parameters such as initial lateral clearance, speed, road adhesion, and coefficients of restitution on the PIT maneuver's effectiveness can be found in [8] .
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In this expression "V c " is the closing velocity between the pursuer and the fleeing node, A T is the tangential acceleration of the driven wheels, "G" terms represent control gains, α yaw is the angular acceleration control signal, and the θ terms indicate bearing angles. This control law can be used by the pursuing vehicle to approach the correct pose relative to the fleeing node to execute the PIT maneuver. In order to achieve the correct lateral and longitudinal offset to perform the PIT maneuver, θ pursuer can be adjusted to correspond to a pre-determined, offset target PIT formation location as opposed to being pointed directly at the fleeing vehicle. For the case where R pf and the difference in yaw angle between the two vehicles is small, the α yaw term takes the form:
, , , ,
This change in the yaw control law is used to fine tune the final position of the pursuer relative to the fleeing vehicle in order to obtain a relative pose capable of successfully applying the PIT maneuver. The nonholonomic nature of the vehicles combined with the heading's high sensitivity to yaw errors for small R pf makes these dual control laws necessary. Once the pursuing node has achieved the correct position relative to the fleeing node, it simply steered hard into the fleeing node to execute the PIT maneuver.
A similar control law was used to resist the PIT maneuver by the fleeing node. For this case, the fleeing node would pursue a pre-determined "lead point" located a lead distance, "LD", in front of the fleeing node along the longitudinal direction of the roadway. The lateral position of the lead point corresponds to the lateral position of the pursuing node, R N,G . The fleeing node bearing control law then takes the form:
And for small |Δy| :
Where R threat is a predetermined constant that indicates the distance at which a node is perceived as a threat by the fleeing vehicle. This control law attempts to keep the fleeing node squarely in front of the pursuing node, thus preventing the pursuer from executing a PIT maneuver. It does not however prevent the pursuing node from attempting "bump and run" tactics. In order to damp out oscillations, it was also found beneficial to linearly scale down the G Heading 's with increasing tangential velocity.
In order to implement these control laws on a car-like vehicle it is important to respect the nonholonomic constraints imposed by the vehicle chassis. For the case of a car-like vehicle with an average steering angle δ, the turning radius "r" of the center of mass of the vehicle can be approximated as 10, 11 :
( 1 2 ) Where "WB" is the vehicle wheel base or distance between the centers of the front and rear wheels, and "track" is the distance between centerlines of a pair of wheels on the same axle. This relation can be combined with the relation between tangential velocity, "V T " and angular velocity to find the appropriate steering angle to achieve a desired yaw rate, " ".
Since this control policy is implemented using a discrete time controller with time step, "Δt", the required " " at each time step given the current, "
" can be estimated with:
Thus far, velocity-pursuit based techniques have proven to be the most effective for implementing a PIT maneuver. The main reason for their success, is that velocity pursuit results in either a head or tail chase implying that the difference in the final yaw angle between the two mobile sensor nodes tends to go to zero. This is the proper pose to get into position to execute a controlled PIT maneuver. In addition, this control law is simple to apply in embedded systems, and the required sensor measurements (bearing, position, and velocity) do not require global knowledge of the environment.
SIMULATION
In order to begin determining the suitability of the velocity pursuit-based control policies for both implementing and resisting the PIT maneuver, simulations of the control policies were run using Player/Stage 12 . The use of these simulations helped guide the development of the prototype platforms discussed in section 6 that are used to implement the control policies in the field. In order to test the modified velocity pursuit control policies in simulation, it was decided that the car-like mobile sensor nodes would be operating in a simulated roadway environment. The roadway measures 5 meters across its lateral dimension, and effectively has infinite length in the longitudinal direction. A node is considered to assume an inactive state if it exceeds the lateral boundaries of the road. Initial simulations were assumed to utilize perfect, noise-free measurements of the quantities of interest. All physical parameters affected by the control are assumed to have upper limits at which they are saturated. This is to keep the vehicles from achieving infinite velocity for example. Future simulations would include the effects of rolling resistance and the power available from the node's motors at any given time to more accurately capture these effects. In these simulations, the pursuing node and fleeing node are assumed to have the same kinematic capabilities (top speed, wheel base, etc). Suitable choices for the control gains were found empirically.
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covered that o maneuver-capab y equal frequen he boundary. ursuing vehicle was that they node to be mad pursuing node. of the walls, it sition that corr me initial cond e pursuing nod rtunately it is n s offset from th x-axis. The pu axis. Around using the con rol policies lea he fleeing node distance it chan the road boun s along the x-a he pursuing no ld state and it fleeing node h Figure 8 The modified velocity-pursuit control policies for PIT maneuver execution and resistance described in section 4 are relatively straightforward and make use of a number of heuristics. The goal is to use these preliminary control policies to begin to ensure that the custom, car-like mobile sensor node platforms are working properly. Initial testing with these platforms has shown that these mobile sensor node platforms should be able to execute the required maneuvers to validate the modified velocity-pursuit control policies. Work is currently on-going to perfect the experimental execution of, and resistance to, the PIT maneuver.
CONCLUSIONS
Techniques for ensuring the cyber-physical security of mobile sensor nodes have not been adequately addressed by the wireless sensor network community. In this paper, some of the cyber-physical security challenges facing mobile sensor nodes have been considered. The main focus of this work was to begin to address physical security challenges faced by mobile sensor nodes operating in potentially unfriendly environments. A framework has been presented to help ensure the physical security of unattended mobile sensor nodes, while at the same time imposing a minimal burden on the primary data collection mission of the mobile sensor node.
The primary physical security challenge addressed in this paper was the PIT maneuver problem. In this work, a modified velocity-pursuit control policy for executing and resisting PIT maneuvers has been presented. This control policy is intuitive to understand, and straightforward to implement. The control policy has been explored in simulation and preliminary testing is underway to demonstrate the control policy on small-scale, car-like, custom mobile sensor nodes.
